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Abstract. This paper deals with the interplay between economic incen-
tives and social norms in ¯rms. We outline a simple model of team production
and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a
social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The e®ect of the social norm on
the optimal bonus rate is discussed, as well as the e®ectiveness of temporary
changes in the bonus rate as a means to move a ¯rm from a bad to a good
equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
Behavior in ¯rms is most likely not only governed by economic incentives but also by
social norms. This paper deals with the interplay of these two forces. We show that
optimal incentive schemes may fundamentally change if social norms are accounted
for. Today, it is not unusual to include social norms in microeconomic analysis.1
However, there have not been many attempts at studying how social norms change
the optimal incentive structures in ¯rms.2 This note should be read as such an
attempt, the results of which are preliminary.
For a ¯rm owner, social norms concerning work are important because they can
a®ect the productivity of the ¯rm and hence pro¯ts. For example, norms may in°u-
ence how much e®ort workers put into projects where only joint output is observable.
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1See e.g. Akerlof (1980), Mo±tt (1983), Besley and Coate (1992), Bernheim (1994), Hart (2001),
Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) and, recently, KÄ ubler (2001) and the literature cited therein.
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Social norms may also keep workers from working hard under relative performance
schemes or piece rate schemes that are adjusted according to past performance. Un-
der many such contracts, the compensation to a worker not only depends on his or
her own e®ort level, but also on the e®ort of other workers. Moreover, peer pres-
sure penalizes those who deviate from the group norm, and depending on the norm,
output may be higher or lower than without the norm.
We analyze work norms in a static model of team production, much along the lines
of HolmstrÄ om (1982). Each agent's e®ort level is unobserved by the principal, but
total output can be observed and veri¯ed. The principal chooses a linear incentive
scheme in order to maximize pro¯ts, and the agents in the team simultaneously choose
their e®orts thereafter. We study the e®ect of a social norm concerning work e®ort
among the team members. In particular, we show how the optimal incentive scheme
depends on the social norm.
We believe that the theoretical possibility of multiple equilibria, which easily arises
in such models, has empirical relevance. Indeed, di®erent output levels under iden-
tical incentive schemes have been observed in di®erent branches of ¯rms.3 Whether
multiple equilibria exist in theory depends on agents' social preferences. While Kan-
del and Lazear (1992) rule out multiplicity by assuming the peer pressure function
to meet certain regularity conditions (including convexity), we side with Lindbeck
et al. and argue that such restrictions are hard to justify a priori. If the regular-
ity conditions are violated, then equilibria with low e®orts and low social pressure
can coexist, under the same incentive scheme, with equilibria with high e®orts and
high social pressure. This multiplicity is relevant for a principal who strives to ¯nd
a pro¯t-maximizing incentive scheme. For example, a ¯rm trapped in a low-e®ort
equilibrium may \jump" to a high-e®ort equilibrium even by way of a small increase
in the bonus if the equilibrium correspondence has a fold just above the current bonus
rate (see example below). Or, from a dynamic perspective, it may be bene¯cial for
the principal to temporarily raise the bonus, until a high-e®ort equilibrium with a
high work norm is reached. Afterwards, the bonus rate can be decreased to its orig-
inal value while the workers' e®orts only decrease gradually, and thereafter remain
high, due to the new and more demanding work norm.4
The paper is organized as follows: The model is introduced in the next section. As
a benchmark, it is ¯rst solved in the absence of social norms. Then, we characterize
optimal e®ort levels in the presence of a work norm and derive a su±cient condition
3See e.g. Ichino and Maggi (2000). They present an empirical investigation of shirking di®er-
entials between branches of an Italian ¯rm. Group-interaction e®ects are identi¯ed which allow
for multiple equilibria. However, they do not analyze the interplay of these e®ects with economic
incentives.
4See Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) for an elaboration of a similar argument.Social norms and optimal incentives in ¯rms 3
for uniqueness of the equilibrium. An example with multiple equilibria is presented
in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
We consider team production with a pro¯t maximizing owner (the principal) as resid-
ual claimant. There are n > 1 identical workers (agents). Each worker i exerts
some e®ort xi ¸ 0. Let x¡i denote the average e®ort exerted by all other workers,
x¡i =
P
j6=i xj=(n ¡ 1). The production technology is linear: output y equals the sum
of all workers' e®orts, y =
Pn
i=1 xi. The principal can only observe aggregate output
y, not individual e®orts xi. However, workers observe each others' e®orts. In order to
focus on the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in the simplest
possible setting, this preliminary investigation is restricted to linear contracts.5 More
exactly, each worker earns the same wage w, and this wage is an a±ne function of
the ¯rm's output,
w = a + by=n .
where the owner chooses the ¯xed wage a and the bonus rate b. We require a to be
nonnegative, an assumption which can be justi¯ed by wealth constraints.6 Therefore,
the pro¯t maximizing owner will optimally choose b in the open unit interval, 0 <
b < 1.
Assuming that the ¯rm is a price taker in its product market, and normalizing
the market price to unity, the ¯rm's pro¯t | the residual left to the owner | is
¼ = (1 ¡ b)y ¡ na.
2.1. Without a social norm. We ¯rst analyze the benchmark case of purely
economic incentives, i.e., when social norms are absent or have no in°uence on be-
havior. A worker's utility then only depends on his or her wage earning and exerted
e®ort. We assume each worker's utility to be linear-quadratic:

















From this it is immediate that workers' decisions concerning e®ort are strategically
independent. Regardless of whether workers decide simultaneously or sequentially,
each worker solves
5HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom (1987) identify conditions under which linear incentive schemes are
optimal.
6Notice that otherwise the principal could sell the ¯rm to the workers. In the absence of social











Consequently, the unique equilibrium e®ort levels, given any contract (a;b), are xi =
b=n for all i.
Inserting these e®ort levels, we see that the owner's equilibrium residual (pro¯t) is
linear-quadratic in the contract: ¼ = (1¡b)b¡na. Thus, the optimal contract - the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium contract - is zero ¯xed wage, a = 0, combined
with the bonus rate b = 1=2. The unique equilibrium e®ort is xi = b=n = 0:5=n for
all workers i.
This common equilibrium e®ort level can be contrasted with the common e®ort
level the workers would like to commit to if they could, namely the level which
maximizes the sum of their utility under the constraint that they exert the same
e®ort. It is easily veri¯ed that this maximum, under any given contract (a;b) is
obtained when every worker exerts e®ort xi = b. Under the optimal contract, this
gives xi = 0:5. We will call this the team optimum e®ort under contract (a;b). At
the team optimum, each worker thus exerts n times his or her equilibrium e®ort in
the absence of commitment possibilities.7
Another reference point is the total welfare maximum, i.e., those e®ort levels which
maximize the sum of the owner's pro¯t and the workers' utility. This sum is simply
output minus total disutility of e®ort,
P
i (xi ¡ x2
i=2). Hence, welfare maximization
requires xi = 1 for all i, leading to a welfare maximum of n=2:
2.2. With a social norm. We now add the following social norm or \work ethic"
to each worker's preferences: to exert the team optimum e®ort level, xi = b. In
other words, under any given contract (a;b), each worker feels that he or she should
ideally exert the same (high) e®ort level b; the e®ort that maximizes the sum of all
workers' utility. We assume that a worker's embarrassment or disutility of exerting
less e®ort than this is an increasing function of the other workers' average e®ort.
More speci¯cally, we assume that each worker's utility is additively separable in wage
earnings, disutility of e®ort and disutility of norm-deviation, as follows:8










7Interestingly, when the workers can commit to a common e®ort level, the equilibrium contract
is the same as without commitment power, since then we would have xi = b for all i, and thus
¼ = n(1 ¡ b)b ¡ na, implying a = 0 and b = 1=2.
8Kandel and Lazear (1992) model workers' utility as additive in wage earnings, disutility of e®ort,
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Here v : R+ ! R+ is continuous and strictly increasing; the more e®ort others exert,
the more embarrasing it is to shirk.
The earlier strategic independence of e®ort choices is lost. What is optimal for
one worker depends on what other workers do. Thus, the timing of e®ort choice is
now relevant. In the following, we assume that workers decide simultaneously. More
exactly, we solve for subgame perfect equilibria in the game where the owner (princi-
pal) ¯rst chooses a contract whereupon all workers observe this and simultaneously
choose their e®orts.9



















for all i. Hence, each worker's e®ort level is linear in the bonus rate. We focus on
symmetric Nash equilibria. Given any bonus rate b and ¯rm size n, the set of such
Nash equilibria in the subgame is characterized by the ¯xed-point equation x = bf(x),





Each ¯xed point x is the common equilibrium e®ort level in a symmetric Nash equi-
librium, and vice versa.
It is easily veri¯ed that there exists at least one ¯xed point x, and that no equi-
librium e®ort is lower than in the model without the social norm. Moreover, if v is
twice di®erentiable and concave, then so is f, and hence multiplicity of equilibria is
excluded in this case. More generally:
Remark 1. There exists at least one ¯xed point x. If x is a ¯xed point, then b=n ·
x < b. If v is twice di®erentiable with [1 + v(x)]v00(x) · 2[v0(x)]
2 for all x 2 (0;b),
then there exists exactly one ¯xed point.
9In particular, worker i does not then know the others' average e®ort x¡i. Nevertheless, the
latter enter i's utility function. One may imagine that workers learn about each others e®orts after
the simultaneous choices, and utilities are evaluated then. In equilibrium, no worker would like to
unilaterally change his or her e®ort.Social norms and optimal incentives in ¯rms 6
Proof: The ¯rst claims follow from f being continuous and positive with 1=n <
f(x) < 1 for all x 2 R+. The second claim follows from
f








We note in passing that if there were no embarrassment of deviating from the
social norm, i.e., if v(x) ´ 0, then the unique equilibrium e®ort would be x = b=n,
just as in the benchmark case. More generally, if the embarrassment were independent
of others' e®orts, v(x) ´ µ ¸ 0, then the unique equilibrium e®ort decreases in team
size n but increases continuously with the ¯xed embarrassment µ from b=n when µ = 0
towards b as µ increases towards plus in¯nity.
We conclude by noting that, irrespective of whether subgame equilibria are unique
or not, the optimal contract has zero ¯xed wage, a = 0, and a bonus rate b which
maximizes pro¯ts, n(1 ¡ b)x, subject to the (equilibrium) constraint x = bf(x). The
function f being everywhere positive, this optimization program can be solved in two









and thereafter computing the associated optimal bonus b = x=f(x). In the absence of
the social norm, this program boils down to maxx (1 ¡ nx)x, resulting in x = 0:5=n
and b = 0:5, as shown in the preceding subsection. The e®ect of the social norm
is thus to replace the exogenous coe±cient n by the endogenous coe±cient 1=f(x)
in the above maximization program As will be seen in the following example, the
e®ect of the social norm on the optimal bonus and resulting e®orts and pro¯ts can
be signi¯cant.
3. Example
According to Remark 1, a necessary condition for the existence of multiple Nash
equilibria is that the disutility function v at least locally has su±cient curvature
upwards in the sense of (at least locally) violating the inequality. In particular, v has




for some ®;¾ > 0. These functions are rescalings of the density function of the normal
distribution with mean value 1 and variance ¾2. Figure 1 below shows the graph of
the associated function f for ® = 5; ¾2 = 1=6, n = 7, and b = 0:4, 0:87; and 1
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Figure 1: The ¯xed-point equation x = bf(x), for b = 0:4, b = 0:87, and b = 1,
respectively.
At the maximal bonus rate b = 1, the equilibrium e®ort level is unique and quite
high. By contrast, at the bonus rate b = 0:4 there is a unique equilibrium with rather
low e®ort levels. Finally, if the bonus rate b is 0:87 we observe multiple equilibria |
with low, medium, and high e®ort. Of these three, only the two extreme ones would
be stable in a dynamic where workers gradually adjust their work e®orts in the light
of the current average e®ort. So, with v de¯ned as above, we ¯nd that at low bonus
rates there exists one low-e®ort equilibrium. At a certain intermediate bonus rate
two equilibria exist, one stable with an e®ort level that is a continuous extension of
the e®ort at lower bonus rates, and another unstable equilibrium with signi¯cantly
higher e®ort. Above this critical bonus rate there is an interval of bonus rates with
three equilibria: one stable equilibrium with high e®ort, another stable equilibrium
with lower e®ort, and one unstable equilibrium in-between. At a higher critical bonus
rate, two of these equilibria \merge," and a stable equilibrium with high e®ort and
an unstable equilibrium with low e®ort remain. Finally, for bonus rates above this
critical value, only one stable high-e®ort equilibrium remains. Hence, it is su±cient
to raise the economic incentive above the second critical value in order to get rid ofSocial norms and optimal incentives in ¯rms 8
the low e®ort equilibria.
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium correspondence that gives the set of equilibrium
e®ort levels x for each bonus rate b (the other parameters are the same as in Figure
1).Hence, the plotted curve is given by the equation x = bf(x), which here becomes
x = b
1 + 35e¡6(1¡x)2
7 + 35e¡6(1¡x)2: (3)
This is the S-shaped curve in the diagram. The steep straight line represents the
team optimum e®ort level in the absence of the social norm, b = x, and the less steep
straight line the equilibrium e®ort in the absence of the social norm, then b = nx.
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Figure 2: Subgame equilibrium combinations of bonus rate b and e®ort x.
Which bonus rate b maximizes the ¯rm's pro¯t? Plugging equation (3) into the
expression ¼ = n(1 ¡ b)x gives








The graph of this function is plotted in Figure 3, showing that the equilibrium e®ort
which maximizes the ¯rm's pro¯t is approximately x = 0:6. By plugging this value
into equation (3) we ¯nd that the optimal bonus rate is b ¼ 0:85, yielding pro¯t
¼ = n(1 ¡ b)x ¼ ¼ ¼ 0:63. By contrast, in the absence of the social norm, we
found that the optimal bonus rate was b = 0:5, with e®ort x = b=n ¼ 0:07 and pro¯t
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Figure 3: Pro¯t as function of equilibrium e®ort.
At the optimal bonus rate, the subgame played by the workers, after the contract
has been set, has multiple equilibria, as shown in Figure 2.11 Thus, at the optimal
bonus, the ¯rm cannot induce the optimal e®ort for sure. Workers might coordinate
on one of the two other equilibria, for instance the low-e®ort equilibrium, which has
x ¼ 0:18. In this subgame equilibrium the pro¯t is only about 0:19, and also the
utility to each worker is lower, 0:82 utiles instead of 1:86. However, the multiplicity
of subgame equilibria, with the accompanying possibility of mis-coordination, can be
avoided by the owner by instead choosing a slightly higher bonus rate, say b = 0:94.
11Multiple equilibria arise for 0:84 . b . 0:94.Social norms and optimal incentives in ¯rms 10
The unique subgame equilibrium e®ort at that bonus rate is x ¼ 0:77, yielding a
pro¯t of about 0:32.
We ¯nally note that the double-peakedness of the pro¯t function in Figure 3 does
not hinge on the multiplicity of subgame equilibria. By continuously moving from
the model without the social norm to the current model with a social norm, by way
of increasing the factor ® in equation (2) from 0 to 5, this pro¯t function will ¯rst
be single-peaked at x = 0:5=n, then double-peaked, with the new peak small but
rising until one obtains the current graph. Hence, the social norm per se induces a
discontinuity in this equilibrium correspondence.
4. Discussion
This paper analyzes optimal incentive schemes in the presence of a social work norm.
We found in our example that the optimal bonus rate was higher than in the ab-
sence of the social norm. The reason is that an increase in the bonus rate not only
increases the economic incentive to each worker (¢xi=¢b=n), but also indirectly
increases the \social incentive": if others work harder (because of their increased
economic incentives), then I also work harder in order to mitigate my increased social
embarrassment (due to the raised work norm). We also found in the example that
a social norm makes all parties materially better o®, ¯rm owners as well as workers.
Moreover, the example demonstrates that, at least for certain social embarrassment
functions v, it might be desirable for the owner to set the bonus rate b just above the
critical value above which a unique equilibrium remains. The bonus should not be
lower if a ¯rm wants to avoid the co-existence of an alternative low-e®ort equilibrium
and it should not be higher, since this reduces the pro¯t, see Figure 3.
The multiplicity of equilibria also suggest a dynamic perspective. For example,
suppose the ¯rm pays a bonus rate at which three equilibria co-exist, but workers
only put in little e®ort such that the low-e®ort equilibrium is realized. To move
away from this ine±cient equilibrium, the ¯rm may increase the bonus up to a level
where equilibrium is unique. Assuming that workers adapt gradually to changes in
the bonus b, along the current branch of the equilibrium correspondence, the ¯rm
can afterwards move back to its original bonus but now at the e±cient, high-e®ort,
equilibrium.12
In a future project we plan to study team production game protocols in a series
of laboratory experiments.13 While we conjecture that this will con¯rm the relevance
12See sections II and VII in Lindbeck et al. (1999) for a discussion of similar equilibrium dynamics.
13In experimental labor markets social norms based on reciprocity have been shown to be ex-
tremely important. See, in particular, the work by Fehr and collaborators, e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger,
and Riedl (1993) or Fehr, GÄ achter, and Kirchsteiger (1997). However, these experiments deal with
reciprocal relations (or norms) between employer and employee while our study addresses socialSocial norms and optimal incentives in ¯rms 11
of social norms, we also expect that institutional details will in°uence the evolution
and strength of such norms.14 Another avenue for future work is to use tools from
evolutionary game theory to (a) analyze the relative stability of alternative subgame
equibria in case of multiplicity, (b) endogenize the social norm for work e®ort, which
here was exogenously set at the team optimum level.
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